New technologies have allowed …rms to monitor low-skill workers more closely, thus reducing the power of these workers. We show that this 'power-biased change' may generate rising wage inequality and increases in the work intensity and unemployment of low-skill workers.
Introduction
Earnings inequality in the United States and other liberal market economies rose considerably from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. Explanations for this change include institutional change, increased openness to trade, and technological change. This paper is about how to understand the contribution of technological change, and in particular of new information and communications technologies (ICTs).
The contribution of new technology to earnings inequality has most often been explained in terms of skill-biased technological change (SBTC). An alternate hypothesis focuses on agency problems within the …rm and the e¤ects of ICTs on the ability of management to monitor the e¤ort of low-skill workers (Guy and Skott, 2005 ). An increase in monitoring ability can be viewed as a reduction in the power of workers, and we refer to this alternate explanation as power-biased technological change (PBTC).
Consider truck drivers. Prior to the 1980s a driver's employer usually had only a vague idea of where the driver and truck were. Now the location of the truck, and even the behavior of its engine, are often tracked by satellite. The skills required of the driver have not changed, but his scope for taking advantage of possible slack in his schedule is diminished, and the employer has new information with which to remove slack from the schedule over time. Such pure cases are exceptional. Studies of the e¤ect of ICTs in growing industries such as retailing, banking and telecommunications show that a widening of workplace power di¤erences following the adoption of ICTs is quite common. Signi…cant populations of lower-paid workers face increased monitoring, more precise task speci…cation, and reduced opportunity for promotion, while managers face more consequential choices as a result of increased organizational ‡exibility. To the extent these studies deal with skill, however, skill di¤erentials appear to be widening, too (Grimshaw et al., 2002; Hunter and Lafkas, 2003) .
In this paper we focus on one end of this problem, the monitoring of low-paid workers. Using an e¢ ciency-wage model, we show that PBTC can account for a simultaneous rise in the relative wage and the relative employment of high-skill workers, generally regarded as a key piece of evidence for the SBTC hypothesis. Unlike the SBTC hypothesis, it also explains increased intensity of work e¤ort, evidence for which is reviewed by Green (2005) .
The model
We consider an economy with two types of workers. There is no heterogeneity among workers of a given type and employed workers always hold jobs that match their type. 1 . All …rms are identical and, disregarding non-labor inputs, output of the representative …rm is given by
where e i and N i denote e¤ort and employment of type i workers, i = H; L (H =high power, L =low power). Our concern is with the e¤ect of asymmetric changes in the ability of …rms to monitor e¤ort, and in order to focus on this aspect we assume symmetry between the two groups of workers in all other respects. Workers' choice of e¤ort is determined by the cost of job loss and the sensitivity of the risk of job loss to variations in e¤ort. We assume that if a …rm pays the wage w i ; the e¤ort of its type-i workers is determined by the maximization of the objective function
where w i; u i and b denote the average wage, the unemployment rate and the rate of unemployment bene…ts. As shown in the Appendix, an intertemporal optimization model reduces to a special case of problem (1) . The functions v(e i ) and p i (e i ) describe the disutility associated with e¤ort and the e¤ect of e¤ort on the expected remaining duration of the job, respectively. The symmetry assumption implies that the v function is the same for both groups of workers, and v 0 > 0; p i0 > 0. The function h i ( w i ; b; u i ) represents the expected utility in case of job loss; the partial derivatives satisfy h i w > 0; h i b > 0 and h i u < 0 under all standard assumptions. The …rst order condition for the worker's maximization problem can be written
and we may write the solution to the problem as
The sign of the partial f i w must be positive at any wage (above the minimum) chosen by a pro…t maximizing …rm and, using the second order condition in combination with the partials for h i ; it is straightforward to show that f i
Technical changes that improve …rms'ability to monitor e¤ort will shift the p i function.
The key property of this shift is that it a¤ects the sensitivity of the …ring rate to variations in e¤ort. Thus, we assume that
where the parameter i describes monitoring ability and > 0. An improvement in …rms'ability to monitor the e¤orts of individual workers makes the expected job duration of any individual worker more sensitive to changes in the worker's own e¤ort. Equation (4) expresses this assumption.
The wage is set by the …rm. The standard …rst order conditions imply that
and, using (3)-(5), the solutions for wage and e¤ort can be expressed 2
In equilibrium, w i = w i and
Combining equations (6)-(7) with …rms'…rst order conditions with respect to employment, we get
Using the de…nitional relations between unemployment u i and employment N i , equations (6)-(8) yield equilibrium solutions for the endogenous variables (w i ; e i ; N i ) as functions of the parameters i that describe the technology. De…nite conclusions concerning the e¤ects of a changes in power (changes in the parameters i ) can be obtained if functional forms for the h ; p and v functions are introduced. We assume that the p and v functions satisfy
The speci…cation of the semi-elasticity of the p i function in (9) can be seen as a log-linear approximation of the p i function around the equilibrium solution for e i . Equation (10) is standard, the parameter restriction > 1 implying that given the chosen scale of e¤ort, the disutility of e¤ort is strictly convex and that an equilibrium solution for w exists. The speci…cation (9)-(10) implies that (6)-(7) take the following form
With respect to the fallback position h i , …nally, we use the speci…c functional form obtained from the optimization model in the Appendix:
where e i is determined by setting w i = w i in equation (3); r and are the discount rate and the rate of job separations, respectively.
Turning to the demand for labor, we assume a symmetric CES production function,
is the elasticity of substitution. This speci…cation implies that equation (8) can be written
With symmetric and inelastic labor supplies (normalized at unity), …nally, we have
The solutions for (e L ; w L ; N L ; e H ; w H ; N H ) can be derived using (11)-(15). Not surprisingly, the fully symmetric case with L = H produces a symmetric solution for e¤ort, wages and employment: (e L ; w L ; N L ) = (e H ; w H ; N H ):
The e¤ects of a decline in the power of L workers (a rise in L ) depend critically on the elasticity of substitution. It is readily seen that if the two types of workers are perfect substitutes ( = 1); both the wage w L and employment N L must increase following a rise in L . But perfect substitution is an extreme case. We know of no attempts to estimate the elasticity of substitution between groups with di¤erent workplace power but power and skill are strongly correlated (Guy and Skott, 2005) , and the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent skill categories presented by Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) are all very low. Thus, the empirically interesting case is likely to be one in which the elasticity of substitution is below unity, and the implications of changes in L are explored in Table 1 for di¤erent, non-negative values of . Table 1a assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function ( = 0) while Tables 1b-1c introduce complementarity ( = 1 and = 10). The variations in L are within (what we consider) its plausible range. The intertemporal interpretation in the Appendix implies that p = 1=(r + ) and hence that p 0 =p = 1 r+ d de = r+ 1 e d log d log e where is the rate of job separations. Job separations happen for a range of reasons (including voluntary quits and plant closures), and it seems unlikely that d log d log e should exceed unity. 3 It follows that will be less than one. With respect to the other parameters of the model, we use a discount rate of r = 0:05 and a rate of separations of = 0:2. Unemployment bene…ts are normalized at one, b = 1; the productivity parameter is A = 10, and the (inverse) indicator of the power of H workers is H = 0:1: The parameter in the utility function, …nally, must be greater then one (cf above), and the qualitative results appear to be insensitive to the precise value. The tables use = 5.
As indicated in Table 1 , a decrease in the power of L workers bene…ts the H workers in terms of both wages and employment. Their e¤ort also goes up but the net welfare e¤ect can be calculated if one accepts the assumptions underlying the intertemporal optimization in the Appendix. Given these assumptions, the welfare of unemployed and employed workers can be measured by h(= rU ) and x = (w e ) r r+ + h r+ (= rV ), and both h H and x H increase for all values of .
L workers also bene…t from an erosion in their own power if the production function is Cobb-Douglas. They increase e¤ort but employment and wages also improve, and the net bene…ts are unambiguously positive. The explanation is straightforward. Agency problems lead to outcomes that are Pareto suboptimal, and the increased ability of …rms to monitor e¤ort reduces the agency problem. Taking into account the derived e¤ects on employment and wages, workers may therefore in some cases bene…t from a decline in their own workplace power. Tables 1b-1c, however, show how the improvements in employment and wages are eroded as the degree of complementarity in production increases. With weak complementarity ( = 1; = 0:5) the wage as well as the utility variables h L and x L move non-monotonically as the power indicator L changes. When = 10; conditions deteriorate along all three dimensions, and the welfare measures h L and x L decline strongly when L increases.
The model can yield outcomes that are broadly in line with US and UK experience. If = 1; for instance, and there is an increase in L from 0.5 to 1, the low-paid L workers raise e¤ort (=productivity) by about 10 percent, their real wage declines slightly, their relative wage falls by about 12 percent, and the relative unemployment rates remain roughly unchanged. One should not read too much into this broad congruence with empirical observations, and we certainly do not claim that the model (and PBTC, more generally) provides a complete explanation of the movements in wage inequality. The simulations show, however, that the e¤ects of PBTC can be quantitatively important.
Conclusions
New technologies may change skill requirements but they also change the relative power of di¤erent employees; the fact that more skilled employees have seen an increase in relative pay does not demonstrate that it is the skill that is being compensated. Our model is limited to changes in monitoring, which is just one avenue by which ICTs can a¤ect the workplace power of employees. Within this territory it demonstrates that the PBTC hypothesis can explain the simultaneous occurrence of lower wages, higher unemployment and higher work e¤ort for the lower skilled.
Appendix
Consider an in…nitely lived agent with instantaneous utility function u(c; e) = c v(e) Assume that the interest rate r is equal to the discount rate. The time pro…le of consumption is then a matter of indi¤erence to the agent, and we may assume that consumption matches current income. If U denotes the value function of an unemployed worker, a worker who is currently employed at a wage w faces an optimization problem that can be written
where the stochastic variable T denotes the time that the worker loses the job. Assuming a constant hazard rate, T is exponentially distributed. In a steady state, the objective function can be rewritten
where h = rU and p = E(1 exp( rT ))=r = (1 r+ )=r = 1 r+ is an increasing function of the rate of separations .
The value function for an unemployed worker, and thus h; will depend on the average level of wages, the rate of unemployment bene…ts and the hiring rate. With a constant rate of unemployment, the hiring rate q is proportional to the average rate of separations
where u is the unemployment rate and is the average rate of separations. The risk of job loss gives an incentive for workers to provide e¤ort. But an increased average …ring rate does not help the …rm unless it raises e¤ort, and e¤ort is determined by the semi-elasticity p 0 =p (see the …rst order condition (2)). Thus, the average …ring rate in the economy need not be related to the average level of e¤ort, and we assume that is constant. In equilibrium, w = w and in order to …nd the value of h = h( w; b; u) we note that
) and the stochastic variable T u denotes the remaining length of the spell of unemployment of a currently unemployed worker. With a constant rate of separations, random hiring and constant unemployment, the stochastic variable T u follows an exponential distribution with expected value ET u = u 1 u ET where ET = 1= is the average expected remaining duration of employment for an employed worker. Using (A1)-(A2) and the expressions for p and s (p = 1=(r + ); s = 1=(r + (1 u)=u))), it follows that h = (w v(e)) (1 u) ru + + b (r + )u ru + : 
